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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Dolores Stephens ("Stephens") pleaded guilty to Social 
Security fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 510(a)(2). In 
determining her sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
the District Court calculated a base offense level. Relevant 
conduct for the purpose of determining specific offense 
characteristics used in calculating the base offense level 
includes "all acts and omissions committed . . . by the 
defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the 
offense of conviction." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
S 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). As relevant conduct, the District Court 
considered conduct that could not be charged because the 
applicable statute of limitations period had expired. 
Stephens contests the upward adjustment in her base 
offense level that resulted from the inclusion of this 
conduct. 
 
Stephens's father, Junius A. Purcell, died on September 
7, 1968. His wife, Cora Purcell, cashed benefit checks 
issued in his name until her death on March 7, 1974. From 
that date until September 3, 1995, Stephens, cashed 257 
 
                                2 
  
additional benefit checks issued in her father's name. In 
August 1995, the Social Security Administration made a 
home visit to check on Mr. Purcell, as he would have been 
101 years old at that time. They soon discovered that 
Stephens had been collecting the benefit checks sent to her 
father. 
 
The criminal information to which Stephens pled guilty 
charged her with fraudulently cashing 43 benefit checks. 
The rest of the fraudulent activity took place outside the 
statute of limitations, and so was considered only at 
sentencing. Stephens objects to the inclusion of the 214 
checks cashed outside the statute of limitations period as 
relevant conduct in determining her sentence. Under 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(a), the base offense level for fraud and 
deceit is six. Under S 2F1.1(b)(1), if the amount of the loss 
exceeds $2000, the base level is increased depending on the 
specific offense characteristics, viz., the amount of the loss. 
By considering all of the checks as relevant conduct, the 
District Court found that the amount of the loss was 
$133,340, resulting in an upward adjustment of seven 
levels to Stephens's base offense level under S 2F1.1(b)(1). 
 
Before the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, a district 
judge faced few limitations in determining a sentence: 
 
       [A] trial judge in the federal judicial system generally 
       has wide discretion in determining what sentence to 
       impose. It is also true that before making that 
       determination, a judge may appropriately conduct an 
       inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to 
       the kind of information he may consider, or the source 
       from which it may come. 
 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). The 
Sentencing Guidelines place many restraints on the 
sentencing process; however, it is still the case that "[n]o 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted 
of an offense which a court of the United States may receive 
and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence." 18 U.S.C. S 3661. See also U.S.S.G. S 1B1.4. 
 
Seven other courts of appeals have held that conduct 
that is not chargeable because the statute of limitations 
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has expired may be considered in determining the 
appropriate sentence under the Guidelines. See United 
States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 840 (5th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Pierce, 17 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Matthews, 116 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Neighbors, 23 F.3d 306, 311 (10th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Behr, 93 F.3d 764, 765-66 (11th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wishnefsky, 7 F.3d 254, 257 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). We agree. 
 
Stephens argues, however, that the District Court's 
finding regarding the 214 checks cashed outside the statute 
of limitations period was based on unreliable information. 
Stephens did not raise this objection before the District 
Court. Our standard of review, therefore, is plain error. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). In pleading guilty, Stephens 
admitted to cashing the checks during the entire period not 
covered by the statute of limitations, but she contends that 
in the period before the statute of limitations, she did not 
commit fraud. She claims that she was cashing the checks 
for a cousin whom she believed was authorized to receive 
the money. We reject this argument. 
 
The Court adopted the factual findings in the Presentence 
Investigation Report. See Appellant's App. at 12. According 
to that Report, Stephens could not give an address or date 
of birth for the alleged cousin. See Presentence 
Investigation Report at 5. Stephens's son, Emerson White, 
said that he had never heard of any cousin, and that he did 
not believe his mother's story. See id. at 7. Stephens never 
provided any further information on the alleged cousin. She 
has not contested the information provided by her son, and 
she has not claimed that her son gave unreliable 
information. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 
affirmed. 
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